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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
In all other respects they are to be treated as ordinary community
property.29 The property bought with such earnings is in all re-
spects treated as ordinary community property.
Wyndall R. Johnson,
Robert W. Woolsey.
IMPROVEMENT OF MARITAL PROPERTY WITH FUNDS
FROM ANOTHER ESTATE
VERYDAY experience indicates that in many instances the
j legal entity erecting improvements on land is not the
actual owner of the land. The legal rights and remedies to be
applied to such a simple situation can be complicated. Of par-
ticular interest in community property law are the problems aris-
ing when one spouse improves the community lands, or those of
the other spouse, or whose land is improved by the community.
Two questions are involved: Is the title changed by the improve.
ments? If it is not changed, does the improving estate have the
right to be repaid? It should be noted that this article concerns it-
self only with improvements which become a part of the realty,
not with movable fixtures capable of being severed from the realty
without injury thereto.
29 Other community property states differ as follows: 1 DE FuNIAK, op. cit. supra,
Note 27, at §§ 66, 114, 162.
Arizona-If wife and husband are separated, wife's personal earnings are her sep-
arate property.
California-Wife's personal earnings are subject to husband's debts for necessaries.
Idaho-Wife has management and control of earnings from her personal services.
Louisiana-Wife's earnings when living separately or when running a separate busi-
ness are her separate property.
Nebraska-Wife has management, control and disposition of her earnings.
New Mexico-Same as Nebraska.
Oregon-Same as Nebraska.
Washington-Wife has full control over her earnings for personal services and holds
them in her own right.




Is TITLE AFFECTED BY THE IMPROVEMENTS?
At least as early as 1858 in Rice v. Rice' Texas decided that
improvements on a separate estate "vests the improvements in that
spouse" whose property has been improved. Since that time the
basic rule that the title to the improvement merges in the estate
improved has not been departed from.' The only difficulty expe-
rienced by any Texas court was in the enigmatic case of Maddox v.
Summerlin' There, the wife owned separate property on which
a frame house had been constructed by community funds and
labor. Judgment cerditors of the husband sought to subject the
value of this house to the payment of the debt. The court did not
refer to the Rice case or any of the early cases holding that the
title to improved land remained unaffected; but, noting the split
of authority in other jurisdictions, limited its holding to the nar-
row facts involved. The court refused to allow the creditors to levy
on the property unless the husband improved the property with
intent to defraud his creditors, and the wife, with knowledge of
such intent, participated therein. This holding is in line with the
Rice principle; in fact, it remains the law today,' but the court
went further and worked out a constructive severance of land and
improvements in its instructions for a new trial.5 One case did
seem to recognize a severance doctrine,' but thereafter it has been
ignored and the Rice principle applied. The Maddox case has, in
1 Rice. v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 (1858).
2 Kane v. Ammerman, 148 S. W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) writ of error refused,
Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898); Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606,
99 S. W. (2d) 881 (1937); Morrison v. Farmer, 147 Tex. 122, 213 S. W. (2d) 813
(1948) ; Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935).
3 92 Tex. 483, 49 S. W. 1033, motion for rehearing overruled, 50 S. W. 567 (1899).
4 Palmer Pressed Brick Works v. Stevenson, 185 S. W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
SPEE, LAW OF MARITAL RIcHTS IN TEXAS, 470 (3d ed., 1929).
5 ". .. the house, when constructed upon the separate property of the wife, if paid for
with community funds, did not become her separate property, but remained a part of
the community estate..., and, being community property, it is liable, if otherwise sub-
ject to sale, to the debts of the husband." (Italics supplied.) 92 Tex. 483, 487, 49 S. W.
1033, 1035.
6 Kane v. Ammerman, 148 S. W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) writ of error refused.
1950]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
fact, often been cited as authority for the accepted rule that the
improvements follow the title of the land.
The basis of that rule has been variously explained. Speer finds
it to be based on the general common law doctrine that improve-
ments become a part of the thing improved.7 The courts, however,
seem more inclined to rely on the ancient rule that the title of
property is moulded in its inception, and the fact that improve.
ments are paid for with the funds of another estate does not alter
its status.8
THE RIGHT TO BE REIMBURSED
Concluding then that title is not affected by the improvement,
we would expect to find a right to be repaid given to the improving
estate. That the improving estate does have such right of reim-
bursement was stated by the Rice case, and this right remains a
part of Texas law,9 founded, it has been said, upon unjust enrich.
ment principles.1" But the nature of the right to be reimbursed-
its limits and application-have caused some confusion. The
definitive case on that problem is Dakan v. Dakan," and the basic
general rule to be borne in mind is that the right or equity "is
not a right, title or interest in the land as such."' 2
In the Dakan case the husband's separate property was improved
by both separate funds of the wife and funds of the community.
At his death the wife sued the devisees under his will to enforce
her right of reimbursement because of the improvements. The
7 23 TF.x. Jun. 95 (1932).
8 John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 133 Tex. 450, 128 S. W. (2d)
791 (1939) ; Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S. W. 281 (1898) ; Miller v. Miller, 131
S. W. (2d) 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; White v. Hebberd, 89 S. W. (2d) 482 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) ; Aman v. Cox, 164 S. W. (2d) 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
9 E.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935); John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 133 Tex. 450, 128 S. W. (2d) 791 (1939) ; Ogle
v. Jones, 143 S. W. (2d) 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error re/used.
10 Note, 16 TEx. L. REv. 580 (1938).
11 125 Tex. 305, 83 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935).
12 Id. at 319, 83 S. W. (2d) 620, 628; Aman v. Cox. 164 S. W. (2d) 744 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) ; Horn v. Sankary, 161 S. W. (2d) 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; White v. Heb.
berd, 89 S. W. (2d) 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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lower court found the property not subject to equitable partition,
yet fixed a lien on the lots and ordered them sold "as under execu-
tion." The Supreme Court held this to be error, reasoning that the
charge for improvements was not an in rem right in the land; that
while the courts will secure to the improving estate the amount
found due it, this is only done as an incident of an equitable par-
tition. That the charge alone is not an ordinary lien on which a
simple action for debt and foreclosure may be maintained seems
clear. It is not such an interest as creditors can levy on."3 This is
not to say that a lien may never be placed upon the improved
property as an incident to a full partition." Equity may exhaust
its discretionary powers in reimbursing the improving estate. In
addition to the legal lien which can be imposed as an incident to
partition, the court may award specific property in fee out of the
larger estate and thus a sale be avoided;"5 it may divide the prop-
erty unequally and fix a lien on the larger share;" it may actually
go to the extent of creating a trust of the improved estate;' 7 and
certainly it could decree a sale and pay for the improvements out
of the proceeds.' As Justice Harvey has written:
"A very wide discretion is conferred upon trial courts in adjusting
equities.... Mathematical exactness is not required in making the par-
tition, and the court may take into consideration any facts and circum-
stances that might have a bearing upon arriving at a just and righteous
settlement .... 19
Under the partition statute, Article 6082,20 there can be no parti-
13 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 469 (3rd ed., 1929).
14 That it can be was recognized in the Dakan case. See also Kalteyer v. Wipff, 92
Tex. 673, 683, 52 S. W. 63, 68 (1899) ; Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S. W. (2d)
769 (1942) ; Smith v. Smith, 187 S. W. (2d) 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
15 See Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 321, 83 S. W. (2d) 620, 629.
16 Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S. W. 769 (1942).
17 Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 (1858).
18 See Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S. W. (2d) 622, 624, writ of error refused; Cleveland
v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S. W. (2d) 472 (1943).
19 Puckett v. Puckett, 205 S. W. (2d) 124, 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
20 TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925), Art. 6082.
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tion between an owner and one having no interest in the land.21 It
would therefore follow that the holder of the mere right to reim-
bursement could not compel partition. Yet this conclusion would
seem to apply to very few cases since the outside creditor is barred
by the express rule of the Maddox case, and the improving spouse
has his remedy at divorce22 or death23 of the landowner. In any
event, the theory of the case in pleading and proof must be equit-
able partition.24
The amount to which the improving estate is entitled is not the
actual cost of the improvements. Rather it is the enhanced value
of the improved property at the time of partition,2 5 although one
case assessed the actual cost of the improvements because of equit-
able considerations. 6 The basis for the rule is said to be that as the
improved estate must necessarily be limited to the title it receives
as of the time of partition, so also the improving estate in equity
ought to be so limited.27 It would follow that if the improvements
had no value at the time of partition, no right to reimbursement
exists."
Certain cases do not fall within the above principles, and should
be distinguished. If the spouse who improves the separate or com-
munity property intends a gift, or if the improvements are made
21 Manchaca v. Martinez ,136 Tex. 138, 148 S. W. (2d) 391 (1941) ; Davis v. Agnew,
67 Tex. 206, 2 S. W. 43, rehearing motion overruled 2 S. W. 376 (1886).
22 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925), Art. 4338.
23 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925), Art. 2579.
24 Morrison v. Farmer, 147 Tex. 122, 213 S. W. (2d) 813 (1948) ; Aman v. Cox, 164
S. W. (2d) 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
21 Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935) ; Burton v. Williams, 195
S. W. (2d) 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) writ of error refused, no reversible error; Puckett
v. Puckett, 205 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
26 Tapp v. Tapp, 134 S. W. 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). It might conceivably be
argued that the Supreme Court in the Dakan case (83 S. W. (2d) 620, 628) stated this
actual cost rule which at one time had some support in the cases. To reach such a con-
clusion, however, would charge the court with stating two inconsistent rules in the
narrow space of three sentences. The word "cost" occurs in a quotation directed at a
different point; the court was not considering valuation of the right. When, in the next
paragraph, the court did consider that topic it correctly used the more cumbersome
"enhanced value at the time of partition."
27 Ogle v. Jones, 143 S. W. (2d) 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error refused.
2s O'Neil v. O'Neil, 77 S. W. (2d) 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) writ of error dismissed.
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for the purpose of paying a debt owning to the other spouse, no
right to reimbursement arises.29 California raises a true presump-
tion that a husband who improves the community or his wife's
separate property with his own funds or with community funds
has made a gift."° There seems to be no such presumption in Texas,
and the gift must be proved.3 ' Nor are we concerned with the case
of ordinary repairs on separate property even though they become
a part of the realty. Since the community secures the income
from separate property, probably no right to reimbursement would
arise in the community for mere repairs on the separate property.
The right should extend only to expenditures beyond those which
are necessary to properly preserve the separate property. 2
CONCLUSION
It would seem that Texas courts have compromised the conflct-
ing claims of the two separate estates, the community, and some-
times creditors, with a minimum of hardship on any one. The
attorney who is puzzled by courts who in one breath speak of no
in rem right being created, yet in the next use the law of co-
tenancy; who sees a civil appeals court concede a "well established
rule" to be in substance contra to its holdings, 3 should bear in
mind that of necessity equitable considerations will control, and
fairness in each individual case will be attempted. This overriding
consideration of fairness explains the Maddox case. The divorced
improving spouse, or at his death his estate, has his remedy at
partition. True, the improving spouse may lose what slender right
he has against the land if it be conveyed before partition to any
29 SPEER, LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 470 (3d ed., 1929).
30 Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 Pac. 604 (1931) ; Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44
Nev. 314, 195 Pac. 93 (1921). Where the husband uses community funds to improve his
own property naturally no gift is presumed absent consent by the wife. Provost v.
Provost, 102 Cal. App. 775, 283 Pac. 842 (1929).
31 Maddox v. Summerlin, 92 Tex. 483, 49 S. W. 1033 (1899); Collins v. Bryan, 40
Tex. Civ. App., 88, 88 S. W. 432 (1905).
32 SPEER, LAW OF MAITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 471 (3d ed., 1929) ; Courrege v. Colgin,
51 La. Ann. 1069, 25 So. 942 (1899).
33 Smith v. Smith, 187 S. W. (2d) 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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purchaser (probably bona fide or not)." It may be question-beg-
ging to say that since essentially that right was in personam, that
since the land is important only as another morsel to throw into
the partition pot, the improving spouse has really not lost his
right. Be that as it may, considering the conflicting equities of the
husband and wife it would seem that they suffer little from the
treatment of the Texas courts. But the honest creditors who justly
seek to follow their debtor's funds find themselves denied both lien
and right to compel partition. They have one sop in the exception
as to fraud, but they must assume the backbreaking burden of
proving (a) that the debtor spouse intended to defraud them, and
further (b) that the other spouse had the same intent and partici-
pated in the fraud. A Missouri court has said:
"The circumstance that the defendants have so mingled their separate
interest in the property that those interests cannot now be successfully
apportioned... cannot now be allowed to defeat the just rights of
creditors."'"
Therefore, confronted with this hard creditor case, with ample law
furnished by the Rice case and the early cases involving disputes
essentially between the two spouses, the court in the Maddox case
refused to mechanically apply the law, but went as far as it could
in protecting the just claims of the creditors without depriving
the wife of her land. A West Virginia court which did allow the
creditors to levy on the improved land went just as far in pro-
tecting the interest of the landowner.8" Accordingly, while its sev-
erance doctrine has been forgotten, the Maddox case indicates that
the ultimate consideration the courts have in mind in each given
case is not mechanical application of rigid rules, but fairness in
the particular case. No matter what theory, then, is the beginning
3 See Dakan v. Dakan, 52 S. W. (2d) 1070, 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) affirmed, 125
Tex. 305, 83 S. W. (2d) 620 (1935).
15 Kirby v. Burns, 45 Mo. 234, 236 (1870).
3 Humphrey v. Spencer, 36 W. Va. 11, 14 S. E. 410 (1892). The court worked out an
elaborate system of proration in which the landowner and the creditors shared in the
proceeds of the sale.
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